Here is the final part of the internet
conversation I had with the poet Joel Weishaus in 1999, while I was living in
Heidelberg, Germany. In this part, I skip footnoting sources since there is a
bibliography at the end that Joel prepared for the original publication. I want
to again thank Joel for his interest in my work and for making this
conversation possible. It sometimes does a writer good to find confirmation in
present struggle by revisiting the past. Seeing how far I've come since assures
me that hard work is perpetual, progress and results an illusion, and change
the only constant. No "fat man bearing gifts," nor at the point where
the "fat lady sings," instead following a "middle way."
Where "not this-not that" (Neti-Neti) is a place in which one can
experience a continuity of experience rooted in the now that also includes the
past as part of the present. For me, unlike Schoenberg, following "the
middle road (that) doesn't lead to Rome," is the only road I want to
follow and, in any case, "Rome" (not as a place but as the cultural
identifier Schoenberg intends) is definitely not where I want to go.[1]
Want isn't even the right word--it has nothing to do with want. It just isn't
where I'm going, which is somewhere else altogether, a place in which I haven't
yet settled, and maybe never will: a decidedly non-Shakespearean
"undiscovered country."
[1]
"Der Mittelweg is der einzige, der nicht nach Rom führt" as quoted in
Theodor Adorno, Philosophie der neuen
Musik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991, p. 13.
Silencing the Sounded Self: Christopher Shultis and Joel Weishaus in Conversation, 1999
(Part III)
JW: You begin your study by saying that Cage "shied away from the matter of 'influences,' believing instead that one's own ideas attract historical precursors," (p. xvi) which is an interesting use of backward propagation! My understanding, however, is that his interest in chance operations, for which he is most famous, was influenced, and not so much by the operative assumptions of the I Ching, as by the early piano music of Pierre Boulez.
CS:
Well, Cage really did love Boulez's second piano sonata and was instrumental,
along with David Tudor, in getting it first performed in New York. The
correspondence between Cage and Boulez is published in a book edited (and with
a very pro-Boulez introduction) by Jean-Jacques Nattiez. It's fascinating
stuff.
They
were working on similar things at the time (from the mid-40s to early 50s), and
Boulez was very much interested in the way in which chance operations, through
Cage's use of the I-Ching, produced a work like Cage's solo piano piece Music of Changes. I wouldn't say that
his use of chance operations was influenced by the early piano music of Boulez,
although I would say that both were very much involved with each other's work
at the time Cage began to use chance operations. The break between Cage and
Boulez is, I think, once again an instance where Cage's work is attacked by
someone who is doing something else and who cannot accept the otherness as
being outside of one's own individual work. I think Cage was always capable of
doing that, in other words, of being able to see his work as one part of
something, rather than as an example of the work of art created in a totality
within itself. I don't want to misread the European Neue Musik scene's
appropriation of Adorno here because it's something I'm actually in Germany to
learn more about. So I'll simply characterize what briefly follows as my (at
the moment) reading of that appropriation in my own ephemeral way of dealing
with the problem Susan Howe likely confronted when she published that excellent
study of Dickinson under the title My
Emily Dickinson.
What
I mean is that the reaction to Cage in 1950s Europe, characterized especially
well by Boulez, rightly attacks what they saw as a serious compositional flaw:
not chance, but indeterminacy, found first in 4'33" (the
"silent" piece) and the "Imaginary Landscape No. 4" for
radios. Boulez, and the composers in Europe who followed him, instead preferred
what Boulez called "aleatory" music. Now, I don't want to get into a
long-winded musicological discussion here but what distinguished aleatoric
music from both Cage's chance operations (which these composers didn't disapprove
of) and the indeterminate compositions that follows (with which they did) is
that aleatoric music offers the performer multiple notated choices that can be
taken, that then open up the heard result--all of which, however, are
intentionally written by the composer so that all those possibilities are
pre-determined by the composer.
Chance
operations replace compositional choices with the asking of questions within
the compositional process, but then produce a fixed compositional result which
is, of course, less open in the performative sense than is aleatoric music. But
then indeterminate music, which Cage saw as the necessary antidote for the
"Frankenstein monster" he had created with his "Music of
Changes" (which, through chance operations, had produced an enormously
difficult work) opened up the performance of music to both the intentions of
the performer as well as, in many cases, the unintended experience of the
environment in which the work was performed. The inclusion of the unintentional
outside was completely unacceptable to the post-World War II European
serialists in a way that I think one can, in retrospect, fully understand when
considering the work of composers who thought there was a direct relation
between the way one writes music (or makes art of any kind for that matter) and
the way in which individuals and societies work. The anarchy of Cage's
indeterminate pieces had social implications that led these composers, full of
both war-time memories of the results of anarchic social situations, as well as
full of Adorno's negative dialectics which saw art as a dialectically
oppositional force in society, to write works that controlled as much as
possible both what one performed and what one ultimately heard. These works
were, at least as I read them, compositions in which the dialectical
oppositions existed within--as models of society--rather than as a dialectical
interaction with the world outside where model and reality would thus meet and
produce the work of art collaboratively.
In
closing, I want to add once again that my views on this are preliminary, and in
fact I would highly recommend an article by Konrad Boehmer, drawn from a
dissertation he wrote in the 1960s and thus full of the issues that I'm
addressing here, that strongly criticizes Cage's work from the perspective of
someone whose own background is steeped in a very sophisticated approach to
dialectical thinking. It was published in the art journal October, I believe in the fall of 1997.
JW:
In Silencing The Sounded Self, you
quote Cage as saying that he hopes to make of words "something other than
language," (p. 116) a strategy "in which words become what they
originally were: trees and stars and the rest of (the) primeval
environment." (p. 117) A language--still a language!--that interrogates, rather
than communicates. Thus the words would be "empty," not of meaning,
"but of intentional meaning." (p. 123)
Is
it fair to say that the absence of intention, of control, along with the
anxiety of failure--by means of tapping into a reservoir of ideas far vaster
than any particular work could hope to portage--is instructive as to what makes
a work of art in the tradition of experimentation?
CS:
Cage's sense of what makes something experimental is pretty narrowly defined in
his book Silence: "an action of
which the outcome is unforeseen." On the other hand, in the same book, I
think it is even the same essay "A History of Experimental Music in the
United States," Cage himself places a lot of composers within the
tradition of experimentalism even though they don't always fit Cage's narrow
definition.
I
see experimentalism more broadly although I do in my book place Cage in only a
part of the tradition, as you know, by dividing it into those artists
influenced (either consciously or not) by Emerson on the one hand--this is
where I put the so-called Projectivists; and Thoreau on the other--where I put
the Objectivists and Cage as well. One predilection I see in experimental work
is an emphasis on process. And I like to think that your use of the word
"reservoir" where the artist taps into a world of ideas (or
experience) that is larger than the individual self would also be
characteristic. I make distinctions in regards to how the artist as a medium
functions in that world--either through what I call control or co-existence--but
I think all experimental artists still emphasize process and the desire to
experience and/or create a world larger than that of the individual
consciousness. And the result would be art that is not entirely self-contained
but that is always contextualized by the world around it.
JW:
I'd like to interject here, with reference to the lineage you diagram. Paul
Winter traces "the American lineage that extends from Thoreau through
Charles Ives to Scott Nearing and Pete Seeger--voices from the 'quiet corner'
of our culture, all artists who went to live with the land, built their own
homesteads, and made their lives their song." So that, from his point of
view, Ives extends from Thoreau, not Emerson! I find this interesting because
it demonstrates just how slippery taxonomy can be.
CS:
I would also add a couple of points. I think that Cage's interrogation is part
of the compositional process but not found in the actual result whether he
writes music or texts. He asks questions initially and then accepts the
responses, or rather, at that point becomes a listener who observes the results
rather than controlling them. And then again, I think that's only true until
the mid-70s, which is why my book ends with Empty
Words. After that in poetry, and even before that in music, Cage's
intentions come increasingly to the fore. In fact, the point my book tries to
make is that after Cage produces musical and textual "silence" he
goes back into a place where nothing and something co-exist. I see it best
represented as that moment in the Ten Ox-Herding Pictures, where, after
experiencing emptiness, the last picture shows a man returning to society and
bearing gifts. Or, in more directly Cagean terms, the moment after the long
silence in his "Lecture on Nothing" where he says, "That is
finished now. It was a pleasure. And now, this is a pleasure." Cage's work
in the 1970s follows a very different project than what I describe in Silencing the Sounded Self. And it is
one where sound and silence, intention and non-intention, are seen as
"needing each other to keep on going."
The Tenth Ox-Herding Picture ("Fat Man Bearing Gifts")
I
also think, regarding the question of failure, that Cage increasingly began to
exercise his own personal taste in directly intentional ways and, in a sense,
was constantly in the business of asking questions that produced results that
did not fail. In other words, acceptance was placed in the context of a frame
that was predetermined by the composer's own making, and thus could be subject
to criticism in regards to success and failure in decidedly traditional ways.
To me, it's like when my colleagues would speak of percussion as something they
couldn't aesthetically judge: "I can't tell if he/she is a good or bad
percussionist--I just don't know anything about percussion." Same with a
Cage composition. If one is oriented to only take a critical look or listen to
results--or content if you will--without taking a critical look at the process
of making a piece, or the form in which the piece exists, then in all
likelihood a piece by Cage will resist good analysis. But if one is capable of
criticizing artworks as processes or as framing devices, something I think is
pretty commonly addressed by both art historians and literary scholars, Cage's
work is much more easily approached. I think, for example, that Marjorie
Perloff's early support of Cage is a direct result of her great gifts as a
literary critic who also has a strong interest in the arts. Musicologists would
do well to read everything she has to say before venturing into a critical look
at the compositional world of John Cage. And, by the way, that's something
still long overdue.
JW:
When Cage was [nearly] eighty years old, he was interviewed by Laurie Anderson.
To her question, "In using chance operations, did you ever feel that something
didn't work as you wanted?" Cage replied: "No. In such circumstances
I thought the thing that needs changing is me--you know--the thinking through.
If it was something I didn't like, it was clearly a situation in which I could
change toward the liking rather than getting rid of it."
This
mental plasticity is amazing for someone his age. It reminded me that most
people become more conservative, more closed to change, as they become older.
One would think it would be the opposite, that a person would become more open to
change while approaching the ultimate change from life to death. It also
reminded me of the Taoist sage, who is said to be born old, and become
progressively younger, more creative. Thus, when Cage was in his late fifties,
he began developing the compositional technique known as mesostics. Could you
elaborate on this attempt at "making language as interesting as
music," with reference to American experimental poetry in the latter part
of the twentieth century?
CS:
A couple of things seem to matter here. The first is that Cage's attempts to
stay open were, I think, framed in ways that are very important to an
understanding of how Cage used chance in his work. Much of the time he chose
the materials that would be subjected to chance and most of the time they were
source materials that he liked. Because of that, it would have been hard to
come up with results Cage found unacceptable although sometimes he did and
sometimes he changed the work because of that. And in my book, as you know, I,
in fact, address the way in which Cage tried to "musicate" language
by removing intentional meaning from it. In Mureau
Cage subjected parts of Thoreau's Journal
to chance operations and then ended up with something that had too much
intention in it. In Empty Words, which
Cage called a "transition from language to music" Cage intentionally
removed sentences, phrases, words until all that was left were letters and
silences thus showing us (and himself) the intentional process by which he
removed intention from language. And that it required his choice to make that
happen; that chance in Mureau had
failed to do what was necessary to make that happen.
I
think that Cage's work changes a lot after the mid-seventies when Cage finished
Empty Words. And that's why I ended
the book there. It's also why I concentrated on Cage and both his predecessors
and contemporaries in that context as well. I wanted to present, as best I
could, Cage's view of things and how he saw himself in the context of his
world. Consequently, I didn't challenge his preference of Thoreau over Emerson,
or the ways in which he "fit" as an objectivist by comparing things
he said about his work with things that could be found in the work of others. I
really think there is a direct line between Emerson and Projective Verse, and
between Thoreau and Objective Verse, especially from Cage's perspective, in
other words in the way that he saw himself as an artist. These are the contexts
that up through the mid-seventies divide the experimental tradition, and I
think that Cage's enormous influence over experimental art is, in a way, the
dividing line of how the experimental tradition as a result will be addressed
historically in our century. Cage doesn't serve as a connection among
experimentalists the way Ives does in music or Pound does in poetry. He's a divider,
an irritant, if you will, although he certainly was good humored about it from
what just about everyone will tell you.
I
also hesitated, and still do, to place Cage in either a postmodernist or
modernist context because, first of all, I don't think that was well-enough
developed historically during the time frame of my study (early 50s through mid
70s) especially not in music. And I think it is too easy to place Cage in one
camp or the other in that moment in time. However, since this is an interview,
and as a result hopefully seen as more speculative and conversational, if I
were to describe Cage using those currently fashionable terms I would do so as
follows: he placed post-modern content in a modernist frame.
I
say this because I think after the mid-70s, and using the mesostics in
literature and the time bracket pieces in music, Cage's work is much, much,
more open to the intentional and to the privileging of the choice of content
that is subjected to chance operations. That's a long story and one I'm not yet
ready to go into detail about. But I am presently working on a study that
compares Cage with Norman O. Brown in which I will do just that. In my book,
where Cage privileges chance and nonintention, I emphasized choice and
intention. Norman O. Brown, after reading some of my work, asked me if I didn't
think I underestimated Cage's use of chance. And I agree. However, my intention
was to show how intentional that use of chance was. In Cage's later work, I see
just the opposite concerning Cage's more accepting views of intention in his
work and thus I suspect (I'm not at a stage of certainty yet) that chance will
be the predominant concern in my comparison of Brown and Cage.[1]
In
closing let me just say that I see the subject of nondualism and nonintention
as being a very dualistic subject and vice versa! I also love to pair opposites
in ways that may at first seem to prefer one to the other because of the
obvious fact that those opposites see themselves that way. But ultimately my
own preference is the Janus face like nature of the world-where, as Cage so
brilliantly put it, "something and nothing need each other to keep on
going."
Works Cited
Anderson,
Laurie. "Talks With John Cage." Tricycle.
(Summer 1992).
Brown,
Norman O. Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Boehmer,
Konrad. "Chance As Ideology." October
82 (Fall 1997). p. 62-76.
Cage,
John. Silence. Middletown, CT.:
Wesleyan University Press, 1961.
Cage,
John. Empty Words: Writings '73-'78.
Middletown CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1979.
Cage,
John. "Mureau" in M: Writings
'67-'82. Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973.
Emerson,
Ralph Waldo. "The American Scholar" in The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, vol. 1, p. 52-70.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Howe,
Susan. My Emily Dickinson. Berkeley,
CA.: North Atlantic Books, c. 1985.
Ives,
Charles. Essays Before a Sonata and Other
Writings. Howard Boatwright, Editor. New York: Norton, 1964.
Nattiez,
Jean Jacques. The Boulez-Cage
Correspondence. R. Samuels, Editor. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Perloff,
Marjorie and Junkerman, Charles, eds. John
Cage: Composed in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Shultis,
Christopher. Silencing the Sounded Self:
John Cage and the American Experimental Tradition. Boston, MA.:
Northeastern University Press, 1998.
Thoreau,
Henry David. Journals. B. Tovey and
F.H. Allen, Editors. New York: Dover, 1962.
Weishaus,
Joel. Oxherding-A Reworking of the Zen
Text. San Francisco, CA.: Cranium Press, 1971.
[1] As
cited in part two, I published an essay on Brown and Cage for Perspectives of New Music in 2006:
"'A Living Oxymoron': Norman O. Brown's Criticism of John Cage." It
does not yet fully address the issue of chance in the context of their
relationship to the extent I plan to include when I complete work on my book,
"The Dialectics of Experimentalism" (in process).